By its very nature, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on an authenticated network channel. This paper presents the inability of two famous multi-party key agreement protocols to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on the authenticated network channel. This attack involves a malicious participant disrupting the multi-party key agreement among honest participants. In this case, other honest participants do not correctly agree on a common key. Obviously, the malicious participant cannot obtain the common key either, and the communication confidentiality among participants is not breached. However, in some emergency situations or applications, a multi-party key agreement protocol design that is resistant to malicious participants is useful. Therefore, in this paper, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants is proposed. The proposed robust protocol requires constant rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. Under the assumption of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem and the random oracle model, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries and malicious participants.
INTRODUCTION
A multi-party key (or conference key) establishment protocol allows participants to construct a common key that is used to encrypt/decrypt transmitted messages among the participants over an open channel. The multi-party key establishment protocol design was first proposed in [1] . There are two kinds of multi-party key establishment protocols: multiparty key distribution and multi-party key agreement. In multi-party key distribution protocols [2, 3, 4, 5] , there is a chairman who is responsible for generating a common key and then securely distributing that key to the other participants involved in the conference. A multi-party key agreement protocol involves all participants cooperatively establishing a common key without a chairman. One advantage of a key agreement protocol over a key distribution protocol is that no participant can predetermine the common key.
In the past, many multi-party key agreement protocols have been proposed. These protocols are classified into two kinds: non-authenticated [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] and authenticated [11, 12, 13, 14] . In 1994, Burmester and Desmedt [10] proposed several multi-party key agreement protocols based on various types of network connections. One notable result is their non-authenticated protocol (protocol 3) under the broadcast channel. It requires only two rounds. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. In 2001, Horng [6] focused on the computational efficiency of multi-party key agreement protocols and proposed a non-authenticated protocol under a broadcast channel, which also requires only two rounds. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages and computes the common key by performing a lesser number of exponential operations.
A non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot, by its very nature, provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on the authenticated network channel, or use another scheme to provide authentication. Recently, Katz and Yung [14] proposed a scalable compiler that transforms any group key-exchange protocol into an authenticated protocol. They also applied their compiler to transform the Burmester-Desmedt broadcast protocol into an authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol.
As we all know, Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol [10] and Horng's protocol [6] are two famous multi-party key agreement protocols under a broadcast channel. Certainly, if the broadcast channel is authenticated, both protocols are secure against impersonators (outsiders). Although the design goal in both Burmester protocols emphasize a multi-party key establishment design with round-efficiency that is secure against passive attacks; it is infeasible for an adversary to determine the established key by eavesdropping on messages transmitted among the participants over the open channel. However, consider a situation in which there is an emergency and some secure conferences rescue missions and emergency negotiations such as military applications must be held prior to a special time. In that case, the destruction of the conference could cause serious damage to many. If a malicious participant tries to disrupt the multi-party key establishment, other honest participants will not be able to correctly agree on a common key, confidentiality will not be reached and honest participants will not be able to identify the malicious participant. However, in the above emergency situations, a multi-party key agreement protocol design resistant to malicious participants is important. In order to obtain robustness in a multi-party conference key agreement protocol, we must address the malicious participant attack problem.
In [10] , Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol with authentication (protocol 7) uses a sequential proof for authenticating the participants. Thus, the number of rounds required in the authentication protocol is proportional to the number of the participants. However, this protocol authenticates only messages sent by the participant, and cannot determine if the participant has sent the correct form for computing the common key. Thus, it is also unable to withstand malicious participant attacks. In fact, previously authenticated multi-party key agreement protocols [11, 12, 13, 14] were concerned with authenticating the messages sent by each participant and with improving the number of rounds or communication cost. They did not address the problem of malicious participant attacks.
In this paper, we will present how both of these well known protocols are unable to withstand this attack, even though both these two protocols use authenticated network channels. To remedy this weakness we will propose a robust multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to this attack. The proposed protocol requires a constant number of rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. The new proposed protocol retains the merits of both protocols in round-efficiency and message size, broadcast by each participant. This is independent of the number of participants. Furthermore, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure. Our new protocol can be applied under an authenticated network channel or use the Katz and Yung's transformation [14] to provide broadcast message authentication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe some system parameters and security definitions. In Section 3, we review and analyze two well-known multi-party key agreement protocols. A new multi-party key agreement protocol, resistant to malicious participants is proposed in Section 4. In Section 5, we will show the security of the proposed protocol. In Section 6, the performance evaluation of the proposed protocol is presented and the comparisons with other protocols are made. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the system parameters and security definitions. The following parameters and definitions are used throughout this paper:
• q: a large prime.
• p: a large prime such that p = 2q + 1.
• G q : a subgroup of quadratic residues in Z * p , that is G q = {i 2 |i ∈ Z * p }.
• g: a generator for the subgroup G q .
• H : a one-way hash function from Z q to Z q .
• n: the number of participants who want to generate a common conference key.
Without loss of generality, let U = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U n } be the initial set of participants that want to generate a common conference key. Each, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, knows the set U . Note that in the following, the indices are taken in a cycle, e.g. U n+1 is U 1 , and U 0 is U n . All users are connected by a broadcast network such that the messages sent on the network cannot be modified and delayed.
Here, we emphasize a non-authenticated key establishment protocol design and assume that the protocol uses authenticated channels. Therefore, it is secure against an attack by an impersonator. In this situation, two potential attacks are defined as follows:
Definition 2.1. Passive adversary (eavesdropper) is not a participant, but tries to learn the established conference key from messages broadcast over the network channel. Definition 2.2. Malicious participant is a participant who tries to disrupt the multi-party key establishment among the honest participants.
A well-known security assumption is used to prove that a multi-party key agreement protocol is secure against a passive adversary. Here, we adopt the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem assumption to prove that the new protocol is secure against a passive adversary. There are several papers [15, 16] The random oracle model [17] is usually adopted to demonstrate the key establishment protocol or signature scheme security. The random oracle model assumes that the hash function is actually a true random function and that the computing discrete logarithm modulo large prime is hard [18] . In Section 5, we will show that our protocol is secure against malicious participants under the random oracle model. For details on the random oracle model refer to [17, 19, 20] .
ANALYSIS OF THE RELATED TWO-ROUND PROTOCOLS
In this section, we briefly review two multi-party key agreement protocols: Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast [10] and Horng's [6] protocols. In fact, both protocols have been proved to be secure against passive attacks under Assumption 1. However, we present that both protocols are unable to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on an authenticated channel.
Review of the Burmester-Desmedt's protocol
Burmester and Desmedt [10] proposed several multiparty key agreement protocols based on various types of network connections. Here, we are concerned with the non-authenticated key agreement protocol. Their nonauthenticated key agreement protocol (protocol 3) under the broadcast channel is efficient, as it requires only two rounds.
Step 1 (Round 1). Initially, each participant (1 ≤ i ≤ n) selects a random value x i in Z q , and then computes and broadcasts y i = g x i mod p.
Step 2 (Round 2). Upon receiving all
Step 3 (Common key computation). On receiving all
Review of Horng's protocol
In 2001, Horng [6] proposed an efficient multi-party key agreement protocol based on Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol (protocol 3). This protocol is more efficient than Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol by performing a lesser number of exponential operations to compute the common key.
Step 2 (Round 2). Upon receiving all
Step 3 (Common key computation). On receiving all z j ( 
In fact, each participant computes K as follows:
z 2j mod p if n is even, and g
Weakness of both protocols
Since a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot, by its very nature, provide participant and message authentication, it must rely on the authenticated network channel or use another scheme to provide authentication. Burmester and Desmedt proposed an improved multipart key agreement protocol with authentication (protocol 7) in [10] . This method uses a sequential proof to authenticate the participants. Katz and Yung [14] also transformed the Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol into authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol. Nevertheless, both methods ascertain that the messages are actually sent by authorized participants, but they do not confirm the correct form of z i .
In the following, we show that the Burmester and Desmedt's broadcast protocol and Horng's protocol cannot withstand a malicious participant attack. Here, we make the assumption that the broadcast channel is authenticated such that receivers can confirm messages transmitted on the broadcast channel sent by each specific participant. Thus, each participant can authenticate other participants and their transmitted messages, and both protocols are secure against an attack by an impersonator. However, participants cannot check if the participant U i has sent the correct form for (y i+1 /y i−1 ) x i mod p in Step 2 of the Burmester and Desmedt's broadcast protocol. Participants also cannot check if participant U i has sent the correct form for z i = (y i−1 · y i+1 ) x i mod p in Step 2 of the Horng's protocol. In the following, we only present that the Burmester and Desmedt broadcast protocol cannot withstand an attack by a malicious participant.
Assume that there is a malicious participant U k who wants to disrupt the multi-party key establishment among honest participants. The malicious participant U k does not follow
Step 2 in the protocol to compute the correct value z k = (y k+1 /y k−1 ) x k mod p, and sends a random number z k = R. Thus, each honest participant will use the erroneous z k to compute a different common key in Step 3, and they will find out that they cannot communicate with each other using these different common keys. Obviously, even though the protocol is based on an authenticated broadcast channel, they cannot determine 'who is the malicious participant'. Therefore, the protocol is unable to detect malicious participants and does not withstand malicious participant attacks. For the same reason, Horng's protocol also suffers from the same problem.
Based on the Burmester and Desmedt's broadcast protocol, we will propose a new protocol in the next section, in which each participant U i may convince other participants that the value Z i has the right form and that he knows the random integer x i selected in the previous step.
PROPOSED PROTOCOL
Based on the Burmester-Desmedt broadcast protocol, we propose a new multi-party key agreement protocol that is resistant to malicious participants. The protocol requires only two rounds and a constant message size sent by each participant.
Step 2 (Round 2). Upon receiving all y j (1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i), each participant U i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) selects a random number r i ∈ Z q and computes and broadcasts (z i , α i , β i , δ i ) as follows:
If two checks do not hold, U i claims and broadcasts the message 'U j is a cheater'. In the normal situation, each participant
Note that in Step 3 each participant U i must check the correctness of all (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i) to ensure robustness. However, considering the cost of computation, there is an alternative approach that reduces the computational cost. Each participant first computes the common key K. If he is ablets decrypt the encrypted conference messages using K, it means that no malicious participant has disrupted this conference and the fault detection procedure does not need to be performed, thereby reducing the cost of computation. On the other hand, he must immediately perform the fault detection procedure if he cannot decrypt the encrypted conference messages using K.
In Step 2, the message (α i , β i , δ i ) is a special signature for z i and is provided to let other receivers verify that U i has computed z i correctly, using (y i−1 , y i+1 , x i ) . Any malicious participant wanting to disrupt the establishment of a multiparty key will be detected. We present a procedure for fault detection and the procedure is as follows:
Detection of malicious participants and rerunning. A participant U j trying to send a wrong z j to disrupt the establishment of a multi-party key will be determined as the malicious participant and he will be deleted from the participant set U , because of two equations g δ j = α j y C j mod p and (y j +1 /y j −1 ) δ j = β j z C j mod p that do not hold. For removing the malicious participant, the pre-participant and post-participant of the malicious participant U j (say U j −1 and U j +1 ) must re-compute (z j −1 , α j −1 , β j −1 , δ j −1 ) and (z j +1 , α j +1 , β j +1 , δ j +1 ) in Step 2. Other honest participants do not need to re-run Step 1. Then, the honest participants may check whether (z j −1 , α j −1 , β j −1 , δ j −1 ) and (z j +1 , α j +1 , β j +1 , δ j +1 ) are correct or not.
We denote that the final valid participant set U is U = 
SECURITY ANALYSIS

Passive adversary attack
According to the definition of passive adversary in Section 2, if a passive attacker is unable to obtain the established common key by eavesdropping on messages transmitted over the broadcast channel, the multi-party key agreement protocol is secure against passive adversaries. Here, we use Assumption 1 to prove that the new protocol is secure against passive adversaries. If we can show that (y i , z i , α i , β i , δ i , g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+x n x 1 mod p) and (y i , z i , α i , β i , δ i , R), for i ≤ i ≤ n, are computationally indistinguishable, where R is a random value in G q and K = g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+x n x 1 mod p is the established common key, then the attacker is unable to obtain the established common key.
First, the attacker's view on the broadcast channel can be simulated using the message view broadcast by U i without knowing x i . Then, we show that the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable from the real one. We use tuples of random variables to model the simulated view of the attacker. By probability argument, since for any δ i0 ∈ Z q , α i0 ∈ G q − {1} and β i0 ∈ G q − {1} such that log g α i0 = log (y i+1 /y i−1 ) β i0 , we have
.
Thus, we need to consider the probability distributions for
Second, according to the above method, for all participants in set U , we have the probability distribution for any λ and,
According to the above probability distribution discussion, we can reduce the computationally indistinguishable problem of (y i , z i , α i , β i , δ i , g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+x n x 1 mod p) and (y i , z i , α i , β i , δ i , R), to one of (y i , z i , g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+x n x 1 mod p) and (y i , z i , R), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, we need to consider the situation for a given (y i , z i , g x 1 x 2 +x 2 x 3 +···+x n x 1 mod p) and (y i , z i , R), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are computationally indistinguishable, where R is a random value in G q . If they are computationally indistinguishable, we can say that the proposed protocol is secure against passive adversaries. mod p for 3 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Note that if n is even, then
If n is odd, then 
Malicious participant attack
The random oracle model [17] is usually adopted to demonstrate the security of key establishment protocols or signature schemes by assuming that a hash function is actually a random function. Here, we adopt the random oracle model to prove that the new protocol is secure against malicious participants.
In the random oracle model, the hash function can be seen as an oracle that produces a random value for each new query. Obviously, if the same query is repeated, identical answers should be obtained. In [19, 20] , Pointcheval and Stern used a key lemma in the random oracle model to prove the security of signature schemes. The key lemma is called the forking lemma. This lemma adopts the 'oracle replay attack' using a polynomial replay of the attack with the same random tape and a different oracle. Two signatures of a specific form are obtained to create a way to solve the underlying hard problem.
The forking lemma is presented here. For the details of the proof for this lemma refer to [19] . In this lemma, they considered signature schemes that, upon input of message m, produces triplets (σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) independent of the previous signature. Note that h is the hash value of (m, σ 1 ). The value σ 2 is dependent on (m, σ 1 , h ).
Forking Lemma. Let A be a Probabilistic Polynomial Time Turing machine, given only the public data as input. If  A can find, with non-negligible probability, a valid signature  (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) , then, with non-negligible probability, a replay of this machine, with the same random tape and a different oracle, will output two valid signature (m, σ 1 , h, σ 2 ) and  (m, σ 1 , h , σ 2 )such that h = h .
Based on the random oracle model, we follow the forking lemma to prove that the new protocol is secure against malicious participants. According to the Forking Lemma, since h is the hash value of (m, σ 1 ) and σ 2 depends on (m, σ 1 , h) our special signature (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) is viewed such that z j is related to the input message m, (α j , β j ) to σ 1 , δ j to σ 2 and H (z j , α j , β j ) to h. Therefore, we show that any malicious participant U j without using the correct x j , cannot generate the correct (z j , α j , β j , δ j ), where
Thus, the message (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) can be generated only by the participant U j using x j and having computed y j = g x j mod p.
Under the random oracle model and the difficulty of computing discrete logarithm modulo a large prime, any malicious participant E, without using x j , cannot generate the correct (z j , α j , β j , δ j ), so that our protocol is secure against malicious participant attacks.
Proof. We prove this theorem also by contradiction. Following the Forking Lemma in [19] , assume that a malicious adversary E without using x j can impersonate U j to sign y j +1 /y j −1 with a non-negligible probability ε. Under the random oracle model, for any specific (y j +1 , y j −1 , r j ) in Step 2, the malicious participant E can generate two valid signatures (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) and (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) with a nonnegligible probability at least ε/2 such that
respectively, where C and C are two hash values of H (z j , α j , β j ) under the random oracle model. Hence, the malicious participant can obtain
i.e. the malicious participant can compute the secret value x j from y j , which is a contradiction for the assumption of the discrete logarithm problem. Thus, the messages (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) are generated only by the participant U j with the use of x j .
Since only honest participant U j uses the correct random integer x j to compute the correct messages (z j , α j , β j , δ j ), i.e. if a malicious participant intentionally sends the wrong message z j to disrupt the multi-party key establishment among honest participants, the malicious participant will be detected in Step 3 of the proposed protocol. Therefore, the proposed protocol is secure against malicious participant attacks under the random oracle model.
DISCUSSIONS
A round is viewed as a participant simultaneously broadcasting a piece of information to other participants. In this sense, both the Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol [10] and Horng's protocol [6] are two-round multi-party key agreement protocols. Our new protocol requires only two simultaneously broadcast rounds when no malicious participant is detected. If malicious participants are detected, other participants will know these malicious participants and proclaim them as cheaters. Other honest participants do not need to rerun Steps 1 and 2. Only pre-and postparticipants of malicious participant U j , say U j −1 and U j +1 must use (y j −2 , y j +1 ) and (y j −1 , y j +2 ) respectively to re-compute the values
Let us consider the size of the messages broadcast by each participant in the new protocol. Each participant broadcasts y i in Step 1 and (z i , α i , β i , δ i ) in Step 2. Therefore, the message size is 4|p|+|q| and is independent of the number of participants. Compared to Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol and Horng's protocol, the new protocol retains the merit of both i.e. the message size is O(1) bit-length.
The computation cost is measured with the number of exponential, inverse, multiplicative and hash operations. Because one exponential operation is almost equal to log p multiplicative operations, we can say that one multiplicative operation is equal to 1/ log p exponential operation. For the sake of simplicity, one inverse or hash operation can be viewed as one exponential operation.
In the following, we analyze the computational cost of the proposed protocol. According to the description in Step 3, each participant first computes the common key K. If he can decrypt the encrypted conference messages using K, it means that no malicious participant disrupted this conference, and the fault detection procedure does not need to be performed, thereby reducing the cost for computation. On the other hand, he must immediately perform the fault detection procedure if he cannot decrypt the encrypted conference messages using K. This fault detection procedure requires extra computation costs.
In Step 1, it requires one exponential operation for computing y i . In Step 2, each participant U i requires 3 exponential, one inverse, one multiplicative and one hash operation to compute (z i , α i , β i , δ i ). For computing
we use a fast computation method as follows: 
Thus, one exponential operation and 2(n − 1) multiplicative operations are required for each participant. Therefore, computing the conference key without malicious participants requires 7 + (2n − 1)/ log p exponential operations. Considering the robustness, 4(n − 1) exponential, (n − 1) inverse, 2(n − 1) multiplicative and (n − 1) hash operations are required to validate (z j , α j , β j , δ j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i) for each participant U i . Therefore, it requires about 6(n − 1) + 2(n − 1)/ log p exponential operations. However, the important point is that the new protocol is secure against malicious participant attacks. In Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol [10] , they did not discuss the computation cost for
According to our fast computation method, one exponential operation and 2(n − 1) multiplicative operations are required. Therefore, the computation cost for each participant requires 3 exponential operations, one inverse operation and 2n − 1 multiplicative operations. Thus, it requires 4 + (2n − 1)/ log p exponential operations.
In Horng's protocol [6] , the computation cost for each participant U i (4 ≤ i ≤ n) requires 3 exponential operations, one inverse operation and n/2+i multiplicative operations. Thus, it requires 4+(n/2+ i)/ log p exponential operations. Although Horng's protocol reduced the computation cost of Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol, the computation costs for each participant in both protocols are still dependent on the number of participants, and the time complexity is O(n). Table 1 lists the comparisons among BurmesterDesmedt's broadcast protocol [10] , Horng's protocol [6] and the new protocol. We considered the performance comparisons among these protocols in terms of the number of rounds and both the broadcast message size and the required computation cost for each participant. The property of being resistant to malicious participant attack is demonstrated in Table 1 . In Section 3, we show that even though BurmesterDesmedt's broadcast protocol and Horng's protocol are based on an authenticated channel, both protocols are unable to detect malicious participants and will suffer from malicious participant attacks. The proposed protocol retains the merits of both protocols in round-efficiency and message size broadcast by each participant irrespective of the number of participants.
A non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot, by its very nature, provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on the authenticated network channel or use another scheme to provide authentication, such as the Katz-Yung transformation [14] . This transformation increases the original protocol by one new round and O(1) message size for each participant. However, Katz and Yung's transformation only provides that the broadcast messages are authenticated and cannot determine if participant U i sent the correct form of (y i+1 /y i−1 ) x i mod p in Step 2 of the Burmester-Desmedt broadcast protocol. Therefore, the Burmester-Desmedt broadcast protocol involved in the Katz and Yung transformation is still unable to withstand malicious participant attacks.
Of course, our new protocol can apply Katz and Yung's transformation to provide broadcast message authentication. This also requires one new round and O(1) message size for each participant. The special signature scheme used in our proposed protocol is also applied to Horng's protocol to withstand the malicious participant attacks. Thus, each participant can convince other participants that the value z i = (y i−1 · y i+1 ) x i mod p has the right form.
CONCLUSIONS
Assuming an authenticated broadcast channel, we have shown that both Burmester-Desmedt's broadcast protocol and Horng's protocol are not secure against malicious participant attacks. To overcome this weakness, a nonauthenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants has been proposed. This proposed protocol requires constant rounds to establish a conference key. Each participant broadcasts only a constant number of messages. Under the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem assumption, we have shown that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversary attacks. Under the random oracle model and the difficulty of computing discrete logarithm modulo, a large prime, we demonstrated that the proposed protocol is provably secure against malicious participant attacks. If our new protocol involves Katz and Yung's transformation, the proposed protocol also provides message authentication. The special signature scheme used in our proposed protocol can be applied to other multi-party
